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Abstract:
The presented article maps processes of bordering, de-bordering and re-bordering in 
East Asia with maritime borders and territorial claims as the central elements of the 
analysis. The key question of the investigation is why some maritime territorial disputes 
are amplified when other are silenced in the region? The author concentrates on two 
island states, Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan), testing de-bordering of their 
neighborhood. This process is taking place however in the context of (maritime) border 
claims and disputes in the region of East China Sea and South China Sea, with numerous 
actors involved in the game of controlling space and setting new borders there. It is 
assumed that to understand the dynamics of the de-bordering processes between the 
two states, their neighborhood’s analysis has to be framed by historical developments, 
interests’ configurations as well as the collective spatial memory/identity component. 
Moreover, the attempts to intensify cross-border cooperation need to be settled, among 
others, in the changing geopolitical situation in the region and the growing power of 
China. Conceptually the paper tries to interpret developments using both neo-realistic 
and constructivist approach to international relations as well as theoretical models of the 
(still emerging) field of border studies.
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1. Introduction
Together with the changing international environment in the last decade, 
undermining post-Cold War global order, borders seem to (re)gain relevance, both 
in political practice as well as in academic reflection. This process has manifested 
itself however differently in various global regions. In Europe and North America, 
fencing tendencies (Newman, Paasi, 1998, pp. 186-207; Wills, 2016) mirror 
re-bordering as a reaction to external threats, alongside the territorial conflicts that 
have reappeared in the former. It is Asia, however, that has been claimed a region 
where state borders especially have gained more importance than anywhere else in 
the world. This process is often associated with a general change of power relations 
as well as the Peoples’ Republic of China (China) political, economic and territorial 
aspirations (van Schendel, de Maaker, 2014, p. 3). Moreover, where in other world’s 
regions land borders are the main object of political and academic interest, in 
East Asia they are the maritime lines that seem to be of key relevance, especially 
recently (Yee, 2011). These processes manifest themselves very intensively in the 
case of island states that have been constructing their territoriality not only in the 
new spatial form, but also in a new narrative logic. 
The presented investigation aims at mapping processes of bordering, 
de-bordering and re-bordering in East Asia with maritime borders and territorial 
claims as the central elements of the analysis. The key question of the analysis 
is why maritime territorial disputes are amplified in some cases and silenced in 
others in the region? The author decided to concentrate on two island states, Japan 
and the Republic of China (Taiwan) (both being crucial for understanding spatial 
dynamics in the region), trying to test the de-bordering of their neighborhood. 
This process is taking place however in the context of (maritime) border claims and 
disputes in the regions of the East China Sea and South China Sea, with numerous 
actors involved in the game of controlling space and setting new borders there. It 
is assumed that to understand the dynamics of the debordering processes between 
the two states, the analysis of their neighborhood has to be framed by historical 
developments, states interests’ configurations as well as the collective spatial 
memory/identity component. Moreover, the attempts to intensify cross-border 
cooperation need to be settled, among others, in the changing geopolitical situation 
in the region and the growing power of China. 
Conceptually, the paper tries to interpret developments using both 
neo-realistic (Telhami, 2002) and constructivist (Burton, 2010) approaches to 
international relations as well as theoretical models of the (still emerging) field 
of border studies (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). Methodologically it is based on secondary 
source analyses supported with the field research conducted in Taiwan in January 
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2019 (containing collection of primary and secondary sources as well as the issue 
background consultation with scholars and practioners). The text starts with a brief 
conceptual debate on borders in the case of state islands and settled in the spatial 
environment of East Asia, and then studies (re-)bordering processes of Japan and 
Taiwan to finally analyze their neighborhood construction.
2. Borders of the island states – spatial environment in East Asia
The field of border studies has undergone a long and difficult path 
from classical approaches based on territoriality, state power, conflict and spatial 
expansion – deeply rooted in realistic thinking (Jones, 1959, pp. 247-248) – to 
a conceptual shift considering borders as social constructs (Monty, Cavazos, 
2016), often de-territorialized, multiplied and discursively created. Moreover, 
scholars noticed that borders are not static but always very dynamic, which 
led to the recognition of their “in-motion”-nature (Konrad, 2015), constantly 
experiencing bordering, de-bordering and re-bordering (Zhurzhenko, 2012). 
They are understood not only as construction, de-construction and re-construc-
tion of borders but also measured with cooperation initiatives and cooperative 
environment creation or opposite processes initiation and implementation. 
Additionally, in the last decade, due to the changes in the global political order, 
classical approaches have again been considered useful in interpreting complex 
border related developments, often being merged with the recent approaches.
At the same time, maritime borders are again attracting the attention 
of scholars, with a special focus on cross-border cooperation of the island states 
and regions (Camonita, 2019) as well as redefining political and identity order 
together with a new approach to “national” and state waters (Yamada, 2011; 
Furukawa, 2011). In some regions, as represented by East Asia, this trend is 
closely associated with the growing importance of seas surrounding states, and 
consequently increasing the number of territorial disputes related to the division 
of waters and control. However, as Keiko Tsuji-Tamura claims, in the region the 
“sea borders have been neglected for a long time by colonial masters and the 
newly independent governments. That is why maritime issues (…) have been very 
complicated” (Boyle, 2015, p. 128). When analyzing territorial conflicts in Asia, 
Francesco Mancini reflects on realistic and constructivist approaches to under-
standing the developments. The former seems to dominate and is based on state 
interests, especially being territorial expression of (changing) power relations. The 
latter is associated with normative order as well, especially regarding the perception 
of sovereignty, identities, concept of (historical) justice, etc. (Mancini, 2013, p. 5-6). 
Agata Ziętek states that most of the territorial claims in the South Chinese Sea 
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have three dimensions: legal (related to procedural aspects of setting boundaries), 
geopolitical (associated with security and changing power relations in the region) 
and economic (especially underwater resources and new trade routes) (Ziętek, 
2016). All three are believed to be settled in the changing geopolitical environment 
of the region, followed by the competition for natural resources (Mancini, 2013, p. 
7), trade route protection as well as the creation of territorial and political identities 
of states. Chih-Mao Tang stresses, that “the East Asia regional seas issue concerns 
not only the maintenance of the sovereignty of the related countries, but it also 
involves the division of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the distribution of 
the marine resource development” (Tang, 2016, p. 156). So the territorial conflicts 
are very often about EEZ, not about islands – their possession and control mainly 
serves this purpose (Thim, 2013a). Especially that the allowness up to 12 nautical 
miles of the territorial sea and up to 200 nautical miles of the EEZ (with the right to 
natural resources) are counted from the baseline, including islands (with economic 
activities or human life possibilities). It is widely recognized that in the changing 
international environment some states are able to adapt better to the new circum-
stances than the others (Lo, 2015, p. 242). And an element of this adaptation is not 
only a more territorially-oriented approach but also new tools and forms of spatial 
competition. As Fuminori Kawakubo claims, “while modern borders still represent 
the power of the nation-state, to some degree, state power is increasingly exercised 
by delegating practices and authorities of state sovereignty to local, transnational, 
and private actors, away from the state apparatus” (Kawakubo, 2017, p. 1).
When looking for the very origins of the political order change in the 
region, the growing political, economic and military position of China seems to 
be the key factor. Consequently, when neo-realistically oriented approaches stress 
strategic reasons behind Chinese involvement in the maritime disputes in the 
region (based, among others, on resources and trade routes’ securing), alternative 
explanations, rooted in constructivist thinking propose normative and identity-
based explanations. For example, Henry Curtis sees them as “motivated by a need 
to preserve a secure sense of Chinese national identity” as reflected in creating 
acting self-expectations and the expectation of partner reactions. Following the 
principle of “Chinese exceptionalism”, this state sees itself as a natural leader of the 
Asian world (Curtis, 2016, pp. 537, 543). 
Both approaches need to be settled in the East Asian traditional under-
standing of borders. As Agata Ziętek indicates, “in Southeast Asia, the mandala 
political model (…), featured political units which saw themselves as centers of 
networks and not as states with defined borders. Additionally, relations between 
them were fluid and some mandalas overlapped so that less powerful centers 
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might have had allegiances to more than one mandala” (Ziętek, 2016, p. 28). In 
the Chinese state tradition, borders are more about territories then lines, with a 
consequence of difficulties in determining the exact location of state (historical) 
edges, and relations between states were based on tributary system (Sato, 2012b, 
pp. 23-25). Well defined state boundaries resulted from western colonialism but, in 
the maritime context, appeared only recently.  However, attempts to more precisely 
determine the sea space can be dated back to the Japanese late 19th and 20th century 
applied imperialism. Chinese cartographic official works produced in the 1930’s as 
well as post Second World War decolonization in the region resulting in numerous 
newly-independent states with territorial aspirations (Ziętek, 2016, pp. 28-29).
Finally, the waters in the investigated region (constituted in practice 
by the South China Sea, the East China Sea, but also, to some extent by the 
Japanese Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk) is marked with numerous maritime border 
disputes. The South China Sea itself constitutes a space of dynamic territorial 
and power related processes over the last decades. The current and already 
solved (often island-related) maritime territorial disputes have included, among 
others, Malaysia and Thailand (Ko Kra and Ko Losin Islands), Cambodia and 
Vietnam (Phú Quốc Island), China and Vietnam (Gulf of Tonkin), China and 
Indonesia (Natuna Islands), Taiwan and China (Pratas/Dongsha Islands), China 
and Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam (Macclesfield Bank/Zhongsha), China and 
Taiwan, Philippines (Scarborough Shoal), China and Taiwan, Vietnam (Paracel/
Xisha Islands), and China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei 
(Spratly/Nansha Islands) (Ziętek, 2016, pp. 25-27). In case of the East China Sea 
– dispute between China, Taiwan and Japan (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands), in case 
of the Japanese Sea -  Japan and Korea (Takeshima/Dokdo), and when investi-
gating the Sea of Okhotsk – Japan and Russia (Kuril Islands). China is involved 
consequently in eight cases, Taiwan in six (always alongside China – as claimed by 
some authors, in practice, expressing Chinese territorial claims (Curtis, 2016, p. 
538)), Japan in three. 
In the following sections, Japanese and Taiwanese territorial disputes will 
be investigated followed by the common neighborhood’s de-bordering analysis.
3. Territoriality, borders and border disputes in Japan
Japan as an island state and regional and global power in the first half 
of the twentieth century, experienced a period of imperial expansion, controlling 
huge spaces of East Asia and Pacific Ocean. Its territory was reduced to the “Japan 
proper” as the result of post Second World War and the following pacifistic turn 
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in both domestic and international policies. However, the last decades have shown 
another modification here. On the one hand, migration pressure/needs, forced 
Japan to manage its borders as a tool of incomers’ control resulting in new setting 
of the on the own political and cultural borders (Tarumoto, 2019). On the other, 
classical relationship between power and space is still noticeable. In his research, 
Akihiro Iwashita illustrates the changing perception of the Japanese territoriality in 
the recent time. Until the end of the Cold War, little attention was paid to the state 
borders, which resulted from security dependence on the US potential, imperial 
legacy negation and relatively stable regional political and strategic environment. 
However, the 1990’s brought in East Asia  silencing the land territorial disputes 
and the opening of the maritime Pandora box in the region including Japanese 
(also previously) contested islands with Russia, South Korea and China/Taiwan 
(Iwashita, 2011, p. 279). A changing international environment and power balance 
resulted in the fact that Japan is (more visibly) involved in several territorial disputes 
referring to the small, remote and often uninhabited (or sparsely populated) 
islands at its peripheries. The reasons behind these conflicts range from security 
and identity to economic reasons. Conflicts affect relations with all its neighbors 
in practice. They refer in practice to the claimed Kuril Islands/Northern Territories 
(with Russia), Takeshima/Dokdo Island (with South Korea) and finally Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands (disputed with China and Taiwan). In the following sections two 
first will be presented, the last will be separately debated in the chapter no. 5.
The Kuril Island/Northern Territories refers to four island Iturup/Etorofu, 
Kunashir/Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai located north-east of Hokkaido 
island, consisting of over 4,5 thousand sq km and inhabited by around 15 thousand 
people. The official Japanese position stresses here that “the Northern Territories 
are inherent territories of Japan that continue to be illegally occupied by Russia” 
(MoFA1). The dispute is rooted in the Japanese-Russian Shomoda Treaty of 1855 
giving the former state control over the islands, and the Soviet conquer of the four 
of them on August 28, 1945. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan gave 
up the rights to the Kuril archipelago (without indicating another country as a new 
posessor), not considering the four islands (labeled as the Northern Territories) as 
a part of the islands (Gavrilov, 2016). Two of them were proposed to be returned in 
the 1955 peace talks, but the deal was eventually refused by Japan under American 
pressure. Between the 1960’s and early 1990’s, the Soviet Union offered to return 
two of the islands in exchange for the withdrawal of the US troops from Japan. The 
1990’s, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, were marked with intensive 
contacts of both states with the political aim to normalize mutual relations, sign 
the peace treaty and reach a compromise with regard to the contested islands. This 
environment was also present at the beginning of the new millennium and under 
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Vladimir Putin’s early presidency (Furukawa, 2011, pp. 301-302). Consolidation of 
the Russian state after the “time of troubles” have led however to introduction of the 
new policies towards border management and territorial disputes. Partnership and 
strategic cooperation with China resulted in both states solving their long-lasting 
territorial dispute (Jańczak, 2019). President Dmitry Medvedev visited the Kuril 
Islands in 2010 which created diplomatic tension between both states (Kuroiwa, 
2011, p. 283). Eventually, after some further promising talks, president Putin stated 
that “we don’t trade in territories” (Micklethwait, 2016). The negotiations failed in 
December 2018, similarly to the talks in January 2019, which was followed by the 
construction of new barracks by Russia.
Map. 1 Taiwan, Japan and their disputed islands
1. Kuril/Northern Territories, 2. Dokdo/Takeshima, 3. Senkaku/Diaoyu, 4. Paracel, 5. Spratly
Source: The author
Jańczak: Maritime Boundaries Revisited...
95
Except from the interstate relations, engagement from other actors can be 
noticed. For example, as the research of Yukiko Kuroiwa shows, local communities 
in north Hokkaido (of expellees’ origins) and current archipelago dwellers are 
much more cooperation oriented than their respective central governments are 
(Kuroiwa, 2011). On the other hand, the principle of regaining control over the 
contested islands is much more vivid in Hokkaido than in other parts of Japan, 
with museum exhibitions and numerous monuments in the island recalling 
archipelago and Japanese rights. 
The island of Dokdo, controlled by South Korea, (Japanese name 
Takeshima, the English one Liancourt Rocks) are two bigger (of over 168 meters 
high and area of about 16 hectares) and thirty-five smaller rocks located over 200 
kilometers away from both states’ coast lines. The rocks were excluded from the 
Japanese administration in 1948 but the treaty regulations were not clear and left 
space for territorial claims from both sides. This resulted in further tensions. In 
1952, Korea unilaterally declared its own control over the islands (Furukawa, 2011, 
p. 303). Eventually the Basic Relations Treaty between South Korea and Japan 
of 1965 stabilized the situation by, among others, mutual recognition of claims. 
The rocks have been inhabited by single Korean fishermen since the 1960s with 
currently two civilians and about 40 coast guard officers permanently living there, 
as well as about 1500 Korean visitors annually. The Korean government constructed 
permanent infrastructure there, including the lighthouse and barracks. At the 
same time, the islands are the central point for numerous civic organizations and 
individuals (Wiegand and Choi, 2017).
The first decade of the new millennium again revived the conflict, this time 
with a focus on national education in the field of territoriality as well as collective 
memory. In 2012, the Korean president visited the rocks, causing diplomatic crises 
with Japan. The latter proposed to solve the conflict in the International Court 
of Justice, which was not accepted by South Korea. The research by Alexander 
Bukh shows that the conflict about the archipelago is primarily rooted in symbolic 
policies of both states. In the case of Korea, it “lies not only in the historical memory 
of Japanese colonization but it is directly related to post-independence domestic 
processes in South Korea” (Bukh, 2016).
Both investigated cases clearly show that Japan, after a long period 
of post-war non-territorial approach and marked with eliminating territorial 
evidences of imperil past, has been heading towards a new (re-)bordering model. 
Redefinition of its own territoriality has led to the new perception of where and 
of what size Japan is. This territorial shift materialized in 2007 and the Basic Act 
on Ocean Policy in 2007. Japan claimed control (territorial waters and exclusive 
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economic zone) to about 4,5 million km2, which resulted in the fact that only five 
other states in the world had larger zones. In the next year, the Basic Plan on Ocean 
Policy was announced shaping the new space policy of Japan (Yamada, 2011, p. 358).
4. Territoriality, borders and border disputes in Taiwan
Taiwan seems to be split in regards to its self-perception of territoriality 
between the legacy of the Chinese statehood’s deeply rooted in land-continental 
identity, and its current situation of an island country, with statehood contested 
by China and not (or no longer) formally recognized by vast majority of states. 
Taiwanese territoriality reflects consequently both approaches, with the second 
being more dominant recently.
Taiwanese (or actually Chinese) sea claims refer to its 15th century 
domination and penetration in the South Chinese See, recalled in 1914 and 
following rivalry with colonial France and imperial Japan until the end of the 
Second World War, and then in 1947 together with the “nine dash line” (mapping 
Chinese claims to over 80% of the South Chinese Sea). France gave up both the 
Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, and Japan transferred its own rights to an 
undefined subject in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Vietnam and Philippines 
claims started in the 1950’s, with the former taking over part of the Paracels (Curtis, 
2016, p. 538). 
Currently both China and Taiwan claim in practice the same territories 
in the East China Sea and in the South China See. Taiwanese political aim, with 
regard to territorial claims, suggests, as a consequence, cooperation with China and 
leaving the implementation of international recognition to this state. On the other 
hand, China is considered the main political and military threat by Taiwan and 
taking neutral position seems to be another option. Reduction of China-Taiwan 
tensions shall lead to joint position in territorial debates with other states, increase 
in Taiwanese distancing form China (Nordhaug, 2019, pp. 43-44).
Current territorial developments of Taiwan, and consequently territorial 
claims (Roach and Smith, 2005), are rooted in post Second World War situation in 
the region, especially deconstruction of Japanese Empire and creation of Peoples’ 
Republic of China. 
With regard to the former, both the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco and the 
1952 Treaty of Taipei regulated the issue of the previously Japan controlled islands. 
This state declared in the first agreement renouncing “all right, title and claim to the 
Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands” but no reference to any new sovereign 
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was made there, and what is even more interesting none of the two actors, China 
and Taiwan were signatories of the treaties. The latter agreement, between Japan 
and Taiwan, became the main tool of Taiwanese claims to Spratly archipelago, 
undermined however together with 1972 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between 
Japan and China (Ziętek, 2016, pp. 31-32). Many authors agree that the current 
territorial tensions in the region result from the fact that “the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty of 1951 did not clarify the fate of some border islands” of Japan (Iwashita, 
2011, p. 280).
The territorial identity of Taiwan is neither only related to the idea of 
regaining control over mainland Chinese territory, nor to the island nature of its 
actual territory. It has been controlling however not only the island of Taiwan 
itself, but also some (parts of) archipelagos located alongside mainland China: 
(1) Matsu Islands, (2) Wuciou Islands, (3) Kinmen Islands that directly neighbor 
the continent. Additionally, (4) Penghu/Pescadores Islands in the Taiwan Strait as 
well as South China Sea Islands located further to the south: (5) Pratas Islands, 
(6) Paracel Islands and (7) Spratly (or actually just a part of the archipelago). 
Historically, it was also Dachen Islands near the continent, Taiwan was forced 
however to evacuate them as the result of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954 
(Matsumoto, 2012, p. 91). 
Much like the Japanese case, the debate over the Pareacel Islands and 
Spratly Islands will be briefly outlined here, where Senkaku/Diaoyu debate will be 
presented in the next section.
The Paracel Islands, called also Xisha in Chinese and Hoàng Sa in 
Vietnamese is an archipelago of over 130 islets, rocks and reefs with the total 
land space of almost 8 sq km and about one thousand inhabitants. The western 
Paracels’ incorporation to the South Vietnam in 1954 was followed by Chinese 
military annexation in 1974 and then Taiwanese and Vietnamese claims. Some of 
the Paracels were taken over in 1945/46 by the Republic of China that evacuated 
its garrison in 1950 after a communist victory in the Chinese civil war. In 1974, 
South Vietnamese and Chinese troops fought over the islands of the archipelago 
which let the latter win control over huge parts of the archipelago (Curtis, 2016, p. 
539). The new millennium resulted in intensive infrastructure creation by China 
in the archipelago. In 1999, Taiwan recalled its claims to the contested archipelago. 
At the same time, Taiwan rejected – alongside China – arbitral tribunal’s sentence 
in 2016, not recognizing Chinese historical claims to the nine-dash line.
The Spratly Islands (referred also as Nánshā Qúndăo in Chinese, 
Kepulauan Spratly in Malay, Kapuluan ng Kalayaan in Tagalog and Quần đảo 
Trường Sa in Vietnamese) are often described as the most contested space in the 
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South China Sea, covering about 38% of its total space and containing about 230 
islands, reefs and rock (Sato, 2012b, p. 72). 
With regard to the complex set of conflicts and claims, it has to be stressed 
that in the post Second World War period, parts of the archipelago were claimed 
and controlled by the Philippines in 1956 and Vietnam in 1976 with claims since 
1956, that in case of  Malaysia were signalized in 1978 and Brunei in 1982 (Sato, 
2012b, p. 73).  Most of the Spratlys have been taken over by China which has been 
contested by other states of the region. The rest is in possession of Philippines, 
Vietnam and Malaysia that also compete over territory there. Unified Vietnam 
managed to violently push Philippines out of parts of the archipelago, later being 
defeated by China in 1988 (Curtis, 2016, p. 539). China experienced clashes with 
Vietnamese ships during the last years there. The diplomatic fight of Philippines 
resulted in recognition of their claims by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, that 
also considered the Taiwanese island of Ibu Aba/Taiping as “a rock” that means no 
claims for 200 miles of exclusive economic zone (that was jointly not recognized by 
China and Taiwan). At the same time, China has been developing (military) infra-
structure in the controlled parts of archipelago, especially in 2015. 
As signalized above, Taiwan controls the island of Itu Aba/Taiping, 
which is the biggest island of the archipelago, of about 50 hectares of land space 
and over 200 inhabitants, mainly military. The Spratlys were gained by Japan as a 
part of obtained Taiwan in 1895 and retaken by pre-communist China in 1946. 
It became a conflict point however between reinstalled Taiwanese troops and 
Pilipino individuals and authorities, especially in late 1940’s, 1950’s and 1970’s. 
The new millennium was characterized by infrastructure development, including 
and airport, strengthening of the garrison and a symbolic visit of the Taiwanese 
president in 2008. Taiwanese Itu Aba control allows Exclusive Economic Zone 
claims of 200 nautical miles which collides with claims of other actors (Kuok, 2015, 
p. 2). This is especially true since Taiwan controls the neighboring Zhongzhou 
Reef/Ban Than Reef/Centre Cay as well. 
In 1990s restricted zones were created, and permanent infrastructure of 
military character was constructed. Finally, marine police boats were sent to Itu 
Aba, to protect against fishermen, pirates and smugglers, but also to confirm its 
own sovereignty over the island. This resulted in the firing of Vietnamese vessels 
(Nordhaug 2019, p. 47). Despite territorial control limited to the Pratas Islands and 
Itu Aba in the Spratlys, Taiwan has been claiming further territories in the South 
China Sea, as officially announced in 1991, including Tungsha (Pratas), Xsisha 
(Paracels), Nansha (Spratly) and Zhungsha (Macclesfield) islands as reflected two 
years later in “Policy Guidelines for the South China Sea” document, as following 
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the 1948 u-line of the pre-communist China. (Nordhaug, 2019, p. 46). In 2014 
Taiwanese Mystery of Foreign Affairs confirmed its claims to “the Spratly Islands 
[Nansha Islands], Paracel Islands [Xisha Islands], Macclesfield Bank [Zhongsha 
Islands] and the Pratas Islands [Dongsha Islands], as well as their surrounding 
waters” (Kuok, 2015, p. 5). This could be considered as one of the reactions to 
incidents in the claimed waters. For example, in May 2013, a Taiwanese fishing 
boat was attacked by the Pilipino coast guard in the contested parts of the maritime 
neighborhood (Thim, 2013a), causing a diplomatic conflict between the states and 
showing another form of mutual territorial claims in the region. It resulted also in 
anti-Pilipino attitudes in Taiwan. 
What shall be additionally stressed are some forms of cooperation 
between China and Taiwan with regard to territorial claims observed there. In 
1988 clashes between Vietnam and China the latter was supported politically by 
Taiwan. South China Sea policies were informally coordinated in the 1990’s, at 
least until 1995, including joint exploration of the natural resources, especially 
around Spratlys and then Pratas (Nordhaug, 2019, p. 48)
5. De-bordering of the Taiwanese-Japanese neighborhood
The main element of Taiwanese-Japanese territorial debate is the Senkaku 
Islands/Diaoyu Islands issue. It is “under the valid control of Japan” (MoFA2) and 
is formed by five territories, (Uotsurijima, over 4 sq km, Kubajima over 1 sq km, 
Taishojima and Minamikojima, 0,3 sq km each and additionally 3 rocks of the 
territory of about 36,000 m2. They are uninhabited. It will be claimed however, 
that this case represents one of the rare examples of border dispute silencing and 
consequently de-bordering in the region, which contrasts to the above-presented 
re-bordering tendencies. 
Japanese claims to Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are based on the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki of 1895 and the concept of terra nullius. China/Taiwan question 
Japanese control and stress  their own long-lasting tradition of using the waters 
around for fishing purposes (Kakazu, 2011, p. 15). The control over the islands 
is executed by Japan as a part of the Okinawa Prefecture. In 1895 it was formally 
incorporated to Japan, remaining there until 1945 when the US took over control, 
keeping administratively it as a part of Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands, which was 
confirmed in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In 1896, however, the archipelago was 
rented from the Japanese government by a Japanese businessman who developed a 
vivid fishing industry there in the 1930 (Sato, 2012a, p. 27). Only in 1971 Ryukyu 
(and consequently Senkaku) was – based on the US-Japanese agreement – returned 
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to Japan. (Furukawa, 2011, p. 304). The beginning of the dispute about Senkaku/
Diaoyu can be associated with the 1969 UN Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (ECAFE) report, describing potential gas an oil resources under the 
waters surrounding the archipelago and Chinese claims to the archipelago in 
1971. This was followed by the Chinese exploration of the Chunxiao gas field in 
this geographical zone (Kakazu, 2011, p. 15). They were not recognized by Japan 
(Furukawa, 2011, p. 304).   
What is relevant is that the archipelago did not seem to play any primary 
importance in the policies of China (Lin, 2012, p. 34) and Taiwan in the post-Second 
World War decades. The claims, based on a historical argument, appeared in the 
1970. Discovering gas and oil resources in 1968 resulted in Taiwanese-Japanese 
tensions over the islands. Chinese claims to the archipelago started also in 1970 and 
manifested themselves in various forms, including armed boats clashes in 1978, 
Chinese activists landing on the archipelago in 2004 or oceanic vessel expedition 
in 2008  (Sato, 2012a, pp. 28-29). Together with the 2008 Kuomintang rules in 
Taiwan, the relations with China improved (e.g. joint oil exploitation projects) 
and with Japan harshened. In 2008 and 2012 there were incidents with Taiwanese 
fishing boats and Japanese border guards in the waters of the archipelago (Lin, 
2012, p. 31). In 2010, the Japanese Coast Guard ship clashed with a Chinese fishing 
boat close to the islands (Kakazu, 2011, p. 15). In the same year they were “visited” 
by activists, from Taiwan and Hong Kong (Nagy, 2013, p. 49). Consequently, the 
islands were bought by the Japanese government from the local landlord’s hands, 
which resulted in Chinese harsh reactions (Tang, 2016, p. 157). Both developments 
were supplemented with symbolic flag raising on the rocks. One of the reactions 
were Taiwanese vessels massively entering the archipelago waters. At the same 
time, in 2010 Taiwanese presidential declaration clearly excluded cooperation with 
China to regain the archipelago (Sato, 2012a, p. 26).
Ching-Chang Chen claims that “the birth of the Senkaku issue as a 
territorial dispute was not so much a maritime resource competition between 
China and Japan as a legitimacy competition between Taipei and Beijing over 
who was the true defender of China’s national interest during which Japan became 
a useful Other” (Chen, 2014, p. 2).  The Japanese-Taiwanese conflict over the 
archipelago itself has been interpreted in the literature as the geopolitical clash 
over the resources, distribution of power, etc. (Chen, 2014, p. 3). But, at the same 
time, “framing the Senkaku Islands as a usurped territory served to demonstrate 
Japan’s everlasting imperial ambition even after its defeat in 1945 and reminded the 
Chinese people about the ROC’s heroic Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, hence 
discrediting the PRC as a legitimate Chinese state” (Chen, 2014, p. 3). Usurped 
territory became an official name for Japanese claims both in Taiwan and China.
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However, besides the conflictive context of mutual relations, there 
are also visible cooperation tendencies between Taiwan and Japan, revealing 
a long-lasting de-bordering process. The very nature of these de-bordering 
tendencies are based on de-construction of the previously separating and isolating 
character of the border facilitated by numerous cooperation initiatives, building a 
cooperation-oriented environment.  It is observable at several levels and is marked 
with several peculiarities. On the one hand, Taiwan is the friendliest of the former 
Japan-controlled territories and the majority of Japanese express positive attitudes 
towards Taiwan. At the same time, some interest-related issues, represented by 
fishing rights, are considered more difficult in mutual relations (Lin, 2012, p. 32). 
The second decade of the 2000’s seems to be marked with compromise 
oriented attitudes and, consequently, de-bordering tendencies in Taiwanese-
Japanese relations. The East China Sea Peace Initiative was proposed by the 
Taiwanese President Ma in 2012 (Lin, 2012, p. 32) and was based on, among 
others, refraining from taking any antagonistic actions, a call for dialogue, a 
respect for international law, a peaceful means of dispute resolution, and collabo-
ration in exploring resources. This constituted a framework to reach compromise 
with Japan with regard to Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. It was decided that waters 
around the archipelago are available for fishermen on both sides, at the same 
time sovereignty claims were sustained (Kuok, 2015, p. 8). Eventually, in 2013, as 
a result of the 17th round of the talks a compromise was reached, widening the 
fishing zone around the archipelago for the Taiwanese.  The settlement is often 
referred to as contrasting to Chinese-Japanese dispute that, especially during the 
span of 2012-2013 was harsh (Kotani, 2016, p. 38). But in the fishing agreement “a 
major breakthrough” was evaluated in the Taiwanese-Japanese relations, leaving at 
the same time China “isolated” in the territorial dispute (Thim, 2013b). Moreover, 
the success of the negotiation resulted in Taiwan’s promotion of the East China 
Sea Peace Initiative, aiming at cooperation instead of disputes, to be applied to the 
South China Sea (Kuok, 2015, p. iii).
When Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have been disputed and debated, there 
are also examples of other islands in the common borderland, representing 
different state of relations between both states. Yonaguni Island represents 
the case. It is located only 111km away from Taiwan (and 117 from the closest 
other Japanese island) is the westernmost land territory of Japan, being a part of 
Yaeyama archipelago (less than 30 sq km and 2 thousand inhabitants). Taiwan 
is in charge of half of the air jurisdiction (air defense identification zone) over 
the island (Yamada, 2011, p. 358). In addition, the spatial proximity of Taiwan 
and Okinawa resulted in (economic) cooperation claims and proposals, especially 
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that both are of peripheral location in the East China Sea context. The twin cities 
of Yonaguni and Hualien created a project of “Yonaguni-Taiwan Cross-border 
Exchange Special Zone”, aiming at intensification of the economic development 
and reestablishment of the intensive economic ties broken in the 1950s (with little 
success however with regard to its implementation as of 2019). The Yonaguni-
Hualien Exchange Development Association initiated and organized first trade 
projects in the 2010’s, resulting in further initiatives as Taiwan-Okinawa-Kyushu 
Economic Zone (Kakazu, 2011, p. 11).
6. Concluding remarks – towards mapping processes of bordering, de-
bordering and re-bordering in East Asia
To map the (de-)bordering processes in East Asia, one more element 
needs to be stressed – the role of China in shaping the new maritime-territorial 
order, especially with regard to its own policy, as well as influencing the policy 
of Taiwan.
With regard to the former, in 2010 the South China Sea was (eventually) 
declared in the Chinese official discourse a region of ‘core interest’ (previously 
applied only to Tibet and Taiwan) (Ziętek, 2016, p. 35). More precisely, Chinese 
territorial claims refer in practice to several archipelagos (Sato, 2012a, p. 19). 
Chinese territorial expansion is very often based on inhabiting islands and 
equipping them with infrastructure  (or sometimes “building” artificial islands on 
the basis of rocks or coral reefs), which has been labelled as s ‘silkworm tactic’ or 
‘salami-slicing’ (Ziętek, 2016, p. 30).
With regard to the later, the Taiwanese policy of no contact, no trade and 
no travel links with China started to erode in the middle 1980’s which resulted in 
improving the cross straight relations. Despite Chinese stress on unification, the 
relations were developing until the middle 1990’s. (Nordhaug, 2019, pp. 45-46). 
As Lynn Kuok claims, “on paper, Taiwan and China share the same claims. The 
dashed or U-shaped line encapsulating much of the South China Sea appears on 
both Taiwanese and Chinese maps” (Kuok, 2015, p. iii). Following the policy of 
one China, China has been supporting all of the situations where Taiwan gets 
control over contested islands (Kuok, 2015, p. 8). Additionally, China has been 
trying to “win over” the Taiwanese elites with prospects of economic cooperation, 
this results in some resistance however (Yuen, 2014, p. 76).
Finally, trying to answer the question of why maritime territorial 
disputes are amplified or silenced in the region, the above presented consideration 
– testing Taiwan and Japan – suggest the following: First of all, history matters, at 
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several levels, starting with the past control over territories, and ending up with 
spatial legacies and concepts. The structure of states interests, especially related to 
the natural resources, trading routes but also security considerations push states 
towards the territorial claims.  Finally, the collective spatial memory and identity 
components are employed by actors involved. Together with the growing position 
of China, the international environment seems to push the states to activate all the 
three fields in spatial competition. This results in bordering. De-bordering, as in 
the Taiwanese-Japanese case is caused by necessity of silencing some of the disputes 
in order to concentrate on the others. And on both sides, the three enumerated 
areas above favored the second partner. On the one hand “Taiwan controls the 
largest land feature in the South China Sea, its vessels regularly patrol the area, and 
it has one of the biggest fishing industries in the Pacific” and is the key actor in the 
spatial game in the region (Kuok, 2015, p. iv). On the other hand, Japan, despite its 
modern non-territorial legacy, has been reconsidering its territoriality.
Moreover, as Ching-Chang Chen clams that the way how China and 
Taiwan constructed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as “usurped territory” brings to mind 
the way Japan has been constructing the “Northern Territories” – both seen the 
islands as manifestation of nations and consequently mobilize identity domestically 
“even though none of the domestic actors involved in this construction considered 
the actual return of the islands as its ultimate goal” (Chen, 2014, p. 17). At the same 
time, neither Taiwan nor Japan are conducting their policies based on territorial 
nationalism, especially in mutual relations. In case of the former, winning of the 
fishing rights without gaining territorial control rights was consequently corre-
sponding with its aims. Moreover, the deal located it in a position equal to China 
and Japan. Japan, despite making concessions, also seem to be the winner. The 
compromise weakens the Chinese position with the archipelago debate (Thim, 
2013b), and to some extent, also in a more general regional power game.
Literature
Boyle, E. (2015). The Future of Border Studies in the Asia Pacific Center for 
Asia-Pacific Future Studies 1st Symposium (March 7–8, 2015, Fukuoka, Japan) 
“Reshaping Border Studies in Asia and the Pacific”. Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 6, 
No. 1.
Brunet-Jailly, E. (2005). Theorizing Borders: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. 
Geopolitics, No. 10. 
Bukh, A. (2016). Korean National Identity, Civic Activism and the Dokdo/
Takeshima Territorial Dispute. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 
Vol. 3, No. 2. 
POGRANICZE. POLISH BORDERLANDS STUDIES   TOM 7 nr 3
104
Burton, P. (2010). Culture and Constructivism in International Relations. 
International History Review, No. 32. 
Camonita, F. (2019). Cross-Border Islands Governance: A Field Analysis of 
the Italy-Malta Interreg Programme? In: Dupeyron B., Noferini A. and Payan, 
T. (eds.), Agents and Structures in Cross-Border Governance: Comparing North 
America and Europe in an Era of Border Securitization. Toronto: Toronto 
University Press. 
Chen, C-C. (2014). Constructing China’s “Usurped Territory”: Taiwan, the 
Japanese “Other,” and the Domestic Origins of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands 
Dispute. Working Paper Series Studies on Multicultural Societies, No. 28.
Curtis, H. (2016). Constructing Cooperation: Chinese Ontological Security Seeking 
in the South China Sea Dispute. Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4.  
Furukawa, K. (2011). Bordering Japan: Towards a Comprehensive Perspective. 
Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3. 
Gavrilov, V. (2016). Challenges and Prospects of the Southern Kuril Islands’ 
Status. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, No. 70. 
Iwashita, A. (2011). An Invitation to Japan’s Borderlands: At the Geopolitical 
Edge of the Eurasian Continent. Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3. 
Jańczak, J. (2019). Construction and Deconstruction of the Borders of (Re)
Integration Projects in Eurasia: The Western and Eastern “Edges” of Russia. Acta 
Slavica Iaponica, Tomus 40. 
Jones, S. B. (1959). Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time. Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 49, No. 3.
Kakazu, H. (2011). Challenges and Opportunities for Japan’s Remote Islands. 
Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 2, No. 1.
Kawakubo, F. (2017). The Transformation of Border Security Practices from 
Fixed Borders to New Modalities and Privatization: From the Perspective of 
Critical Border Studies. Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 8, No 1. 
Konrad, V. (2015). Toward a Theory of Borders in Motion. Journal of Borderlands 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1.
Kotani, T. (2016). Regional Approaches to Territorial Dispute Management. In: 
Dossani, R.,Harold, Scott W. (eds.), Maritime Issues in the East and South China 
Seas. Rand: Santa Monica, CA.
Kuok, L. (2015). Tides of Change: Taiwan’s evolving position in the South China 
Sea and why other actors should take notice, “East Asia Policy Paper”, 5 May.
Kuroiwa, Y. (2011). Northern Challenges: The Japan–Russian Border Dispute and 
Local Voices. Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3. 
Lin, C.-Y, (2012). Lingering Territorial Dispute and Taiwan – Japan – US – China 
Relations. Asian Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4. 
Lin, C.-Y. (2016). China’s Troubled Waters in the East and South China Seas: A 
Taiwanese Assessment. In: Dossani, R. and Harold, S. W. (eds.), Maritime Issues 
in the East and South China Seas,  Rand: Santa Monica, CA.
Jańczak: Maritime Boundaries Revisited...
105
Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the New World Disorder. Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press.
Lou, C. (2016). Navigating Through Troubled Waters by Joint Development. In: 
Dossani, R. and Harold, S. W. (eds.), Maritime Issues in the East and South China 
Seas,  Rand: Santa Monica, CA.
Mancini, F. (2013). Uncertain Borders: Territorial Disputes in Asia. ISPI Analysis, 
No. 180.
Matsumoto, H. (2012). The First Taiwan Strait Crisis and China’s “Border” 
Dispute Around Taiwan. Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 3, Special Issue.
MoFA1 – Ministery of Foreign Affairs of Japan, official webpage https://www.
mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html, accessed 21.11.2019.
MoFA2 – Ministery of Foreign Affairs of Japan, official webpage https://www.
mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html, accessed 21.11.2019.
Monty, R. W., Cavazos, A.G. (2016). Building Rhetorical Theory through 
Discursively Constructed Borders. Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1. 
Nagy, S. R. (2013). Territorial Disputes, Trade and Diplomacy: Examining the 
repercussions of the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute on bilateral trade. China 
Perspectives, No. 4. 
Newman, D., Paasi, A. (1998). Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: 
Boundary Narratives in Political Ggeography. Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 
22, No. 2. 
Nordhaug, K. (1999). Taiwan and the South China Sea Conflict: the «China 
connection» revisited (conference paper).
Roach, J. A., Smith, R. W. (2005). Taiwan’s Maritime Claims, Office of Oceans 
Affairs. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
U.S: Washington, D.C.
Sato, K. (2012a). China’s Territorial Claims at Sea: The East China and South 
China Sea (Part I). Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 3, No. 1.
Sato, K. (2012b). China’s “Frontiers”: Issues Concerning Territorial Claims at Sea 
– Security Implications in the East China Sea and the South China Sea (Part II), 
Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 3, No. 2. 
Tang, C.-M. (2016). Taiwan’s Challenges in the Changing Landscape of Regional 
Security and Economy in the Asia-Pacific Region after the Cold War. Studia z 
Polityki Publicznej, Vol. 12, No. 4.
Tarumoto, H. (2019). Why restrictive refugee policy can be retained? A Japanese 
case. Migration and Development, Vol. 8, No. 1. 
Telhami, S. (2002). Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy. Security 
Studies, No. 11. 
Thim, M. (2013a). Taiwan’s dispute with the Philippines (I): One international 
law, two interpretations. Asia Dialog, May 19.
POGRANICZE. POLISH BORDERLANDS STUDIES   TOM 7 nr 3
106
Thim, M. (2013b). Senkaku Breakthrough: Taiwan and Japan agree on fishing 
rights. Japan Security Watch, April 10.
van Schendel, W., de Maaker, E. (2014). Asian Borderlands: Introducing their 
Permeability, Strategic Uses and Meanings. Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 
29, No. 1. 
Wiegand, K., Choi, A. (2017). Nationalism, Public Opinion, and Dispute 
Resolution: The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute. Journal of Asian Pacific 
Communication, Vol. 27. 
Wills, E. R. (2016). Constructing a “Wall”: Discursive Fields, Social Movements, 
and the Politics of the [Wall/Barrier/Fence]. Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 
31, No. 3. 
Yamada, Y. (2011). Japan’s New National Border Strategy and Maritime Security. 
Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3.  
Yee, A. (2011). Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative 
Analysis of the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Journal of Current 
Chinese Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 2. 
Yuen, S. (2014). Under the Shadow of China. China Perspectives, No. 2.
Zhurzhenko, T. (2012). Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-first Century: 
Understanding Borders. Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3. 
Ziętek, A. W. (2016). The South China Sea: A Place af Rivalry and Power 
Management. Teka Kom. Politol. Stos. Międzynar., Vol. 11, No. 1.
Ponownie o granicach morskich. Deborderyzacja sąsiedztwa tajwańsko-
japońskiego w kontekście tendencji (re)borderyzacyjnych w regionie Morza 
Wschodniochińskiego i Południowochińskiego.
Streszczenie:
Zaprezentowany artykuł opisuje procesy borderyzacji, deborderyzacji i reborderyzacji 
w Azji Wschodniej, z granicami morskimi i roszczeniami terytorialnymi jako 
centralnymi elementami analizy. Jej kluczowe pytanie to dlaczego niektóre spory 
terytorialne dotyczące obszarów morskich ulegają intensyfikacji, podczas gdy inne 
wyciszeniu w badanym regionie? Autor koncentruje się na państwach wyspiarskich: 
Japonii i Republice Chińskiej (Tajwanie), analizując ich wzajemne relacje. Osadzone 
są one w kontekście (morskich) roszczeń terytorialnych i sporów w regionie Morza 
Wschodniochińskiego i Południowochińskiego, z licznymi aktorami zaangażowanymi 
w rywalizację o kontrolę przestrzeni i ustalanie nowych granic. W analizie przyjęto 
założenie, że aby zrozumieć dynamikę procesów deborderyzacji pomiędzy opisywanymi 
państwami, badanie ich sąsiedztwa musi być umieszczone w kontekście historycznych 
relacji, struktury interesów oraz pamięci zbiorowej odniesionej do tożsamości 
terytorialnej. Ponadto, próby zintensyfikowania współpracy transgranicznej muszą być 
analizowane przy uwzględnieniu zmieniającej się sytuacji geopolitycznej w regionie 
i rosnącej potęgi Chin. Na poziomie koncepcyjnym artykuł interpretuje badane procesy 
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przy użyciu zarówno neorealistycznego, jak i konstruktywistycznego paradygmatu 
stosunków międzynarodowych, a także teoretycznych modeli (wciąż tworzącej się) 
dyscypliny badań nad granicami.
Słowa kluczowe:
granice w Azji Wschodniej, Tajwan, Japonia, deborderyzacja, reborderyzacja 
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